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Street Earnings and Board Independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the characteristics of Street Earnings and board independence to understand how 
board structure shapes disclosure.  We find that when boards contain fewer independent 
directors, exclusions from Street Earnings (1) have more predictive ability for future earnings, 
suggesting that the excluded expenses are less transitory, (2) are increasingly likely to occur in 
quarters when Street Earnings exceed analyst expectations but GAAP earnings do not, indicating 
that managers are more likely to use Street Earnings to meet the analyst forecast, (3) have a 
significantly stronger association with subsequent returns, indicating that the excluded expenses 
are less transparent as investors are slow to price their future earnings implications, and (4) are 
more strongly related to the intensity of insider trading activity.  We obtain these results despite 
tests demonstrating that analysts reverse more management exclusions as boards become less 
independent.  Overall, our results suggest that board independence is associated with the quality 
of voluntary earnings-related disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the relation between board structure and discretionary disclosure by 
examining how the nature and use of Street Earnings varies with board independence.  Street 
Earnings is a quarterly earnings measure issued by managers and adjusted by analysts as an 
alternative to GAAP earnings.  While Street Earnings are more valuation-relevant than GAAP 
earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson, 2003), the 
calculation of Street Earnings is not governed by specific rules nor are they audited.  Thus, their 
computation is discretionary and susceptible to opportunistic choices by managers (Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman, 2003).  Prior research finds that board independence is linked to both 
management actions and with the quality of the financial information (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002a).  Because boards of directors review earnings releases, we explore 
whether stronger board oversight can curb the opportunistic use of this form of disclosure.  
Our main test examining the link between Street Exclusions and board structure is 
grounded in the notion that Street Earnings are designed to provide investors with a measure of 
earnings from continuing operations that is useful for valuation (Frankel and Roychowdhury, 
2005).  Therefore, expenses excluded from Street Earnings (hereafter Street Exclusions) should 
represent transitory rather than permanent items, an assumption maintained throughout the paper.  
We estimate the future earnings implications of Street Exclusions by estimating regressions of 
future GAAP earnings on current Street Earnings and Street Exclusions.1  We define “low 
quality” exclusions as those that have the highest predictive power for future earnings, and then 
                                                 
1
 We study the correlation between current expenses and future expenses rather than the correlation between current 
expenses and future cash flows to isolate the permanence of earnings components.  Large, one-time current expenses 
are expected to be correlated with future cash flows to the extent that they recognize cash outflows expected to arise 
from future transactions.  For example, a restructuring charge in year t anticipates cash outflows in year t+1.     
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explore cross-sectional variation in this predictive power with board independence.2  For our 
sample of 75,875 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2002, we find that Street Exclusions 
have significantly larger future earnings implications when boards contain fewer independent 
directors.  This result holds after controlling for firm size, growth, analyst following, losses, 
earnings volatility, and industry membership, suggesting that managers are more likely to 
exclude “permanent” expenses from Street Earnings when boards are less independent. To 
provide corroborating evidence of opportunism, we study whether board independence is 
associated with (1) the use of exclusions to meet analyst expectations, (2) the relation between 
exclusions and future returns, and (3) whether exclusions are associated with increased insider 
trading.   
First, both Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Doyle and Soliman (2005) suggest that 
Street Exclusions allow managers to report earnings that exceed analyst forecasts.  We extend 
this research by examining the link between this behavior and board independence, thus 
providing evidence on whether boards with more independent directors can curtail this type of 
behavior by management.  We find that firms with more independent directors are less likely to 
have Street Earnings that meet or beat analyst expectations when GAAP earnings miss this 
benchmark.   
Next we examine whether the transparency of Street Exclusions is linked to board 
structure by estimating regressions of Street Exclusions on future returns.  Doyle et al. (2003) 
find evidence suggesting the stock market is slow to incorporate valuation-relevant information 
contained in Street Exclusions and document related subsequent negative abnormal returns.  If 
boards with greater independence increase the transparency of voluntary disclosures thereby 
                                                 
2
 Gu and Chen (2004) also use the permanence of the components of exclusions from core earnings to measure the 
quality of the exclusions.  Lipe (1986) uses a similar method to identify transitory items. 
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facilitating the incorporation of valuation-relevant exclusions into prices, we expect the relation 
between Street Exclusions and future returns to be weaker when boards contain more outside 
directors.  Consistently, we find that the Street Exclusions disclosed by firms with higher 
proportions of outside directors have a weaker association with future negative abnormal returns 
over the next year.   
Increased transparency also implies reduced opportunities for insiders to benefit by 
trading on exclusions when boards are more independent.  The previous tests do not provide 
evidence that managers seek private gains at the expense of shareholders in their choice of Street 
Exclusions.  Accordingly, we investigate whether the link between private management benefits 
and Street Exclusions is weaker in firms with more independent boards, and look at whether 
firms with more independent boards have a lower association between insider trading activity 
and the permanence of Street Exclusions.  Consistent with board independence mitigating 
managerial opportunism, we find that the relation between the permanence of Street Exclusions 
and insider trading activity following the earnings announcement is stronger when boards are 
less independent.   
In sum, Street Exclusions are 1) more likely to enable the manager to meet the consensus 
analyst forecast when they otherwise would not, 2) more strongly associated with future 
abnormal returns (i.e., less transparent), and 3) more likely to be used opportunistically by 
managers before they trade their shares.  Overall, the evidence is consistent with board 
independence mitigating opportunism in the determination of Street Earnings. 
Throughout the tests described above, we use I/B/E/S actual earnings to measure Street 
Earnings and Street Exclusions.  As previously noted, analysts make adjustments to Street 
Earnings after managers choose which expenses to exclude in a given quarter.  Gu and Chen 
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(2004) find that the portion of expenses that are excluded by management in the press release but 
re-inserted by analysts (hereafter Inclusions) are of lower quality (i.e., more permanent) than the 
remaining Street Exclusions.3  This finding suggests that analysts might provide a substitute 
oversight mechanism and will be more active when board independence is lower.  Therefore, we 
examine whether the magnitude of Inclusions varies with board independence.  We find that 
Inclusions are decreasing in the level of board independence.  Thus, analysts reverse more of 
management’s exclusions when boards have fewer independent directors.  Our results suggest 
that managers’ disclosures are more likely to produce Street Earnings that represent permanent 
earnings when boards are more independent and that analysts do not completely eliminate this 
effect, perhaps because distinguishing between permanent and transitory earnings items is costly 
for outsiders.  
Our findings contribute to both the voluntary disclosure and governance literatures.  
Street Earnings, as noted above, have been found to be both informative to equity investors (e.g., 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003) and 
opportunistic (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Doyle et al., 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; 
Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Mergenthaler, 2004; Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto, 2005).  
Rather than attempting to distinguish between these alternatives, which need not be mutually 
exclusive, we examine cross-sectional variation in various measures of opportunism with respect 
to the computation of Street Earnings. 
This paper also adds to our body of knowledge regarding board independence.  While 
evidence indicates board independence improves the quality of financial reporting and disclosure 
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002a; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; 
                                                 
3
 Doyle et al. (2003) find that excluded expenses are not entirely transitory even after analysts reinstate the lowest 
quality excluded expenses made by management. 
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Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), several studies suggest that the effects of board independence are 
weak or non-existent (e.g., Bushman, Chan, Engel and Smith, 2004; Vafeas, 2000; Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna, 2004).  Street Earnings provides a sensitive proxy for the effects of 
governance on disclosure quality because, for example, while GAAP earnings are audited and 
management forecasts can be compared to earnings realizations, the appropriateness of the Street 
Earnings computation is more difficult to verify.  Therefore, in determining Street Earnings, 
management has discretion beyond that permitted in the computation of GAAP earnings or in the 
disclosure of earnings forecasts.  We provide evidence consistent with opportunism in the 
disclosure of Street Earnings varying cross-sectionally with board independence.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we develop and 
motivate our hypotheses.  Section 3 presents our sample and variable measurement.  Section 4 
presents our research design and test results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
Given the separation between decision functions and residual risk bearing (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), the reduction of agency costs becomes an important factor in achieving 
organizational efficiency.4  Combined with legal protection, corporate transparency provides a 
means to reduce agency costs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1998).  By 
disclosing a non-GAAP operating-earnings measure indicative of future performance, managers 
can provide incremental information to investors over GAAP earnings.  Providing such 
information is often the reason offered by managers to justify disclosure of non-GAAP earnings.5  
                                                 
4
 We focus on the alignment of interests between shareholders and managers, but efficient organizational design 
would minimize contracting costs between all factors of productions (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
5
 See for example, the August 3, 2004 earnings release of ParaEXEL, Inc. (http://www.parexel.com/ 
investor_relations/press_releasesSingle.asp?id=191) or the July 27, 2004 earnings release of BMC Software 
(http://www.bmc.com/corporate/nr2004/072704_1.html). 
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According to incentive signaling theory (Ross, 1979), managers will strive to reduce information 
asymmetry because they are penalized for the loss in efficiency associated with retaining the 
ability to profit from private information.    
In contrast to research on voluntary disclosure, theoretical research has yet to define the 
role of corporate boards or why they arise (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001).  Despite this 
impediment, empirical research has sought to explore the link between independent directors and 
board actions.  For example, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find weak governance 
structures are associated with increased CEO pay.  However, they find that CEO pay is declining 
in the number of inside directors.  Klein (2002a) finds a negative relation between board 
independence and the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  Bowen, Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2004) study the link between governance and financial accounting discretion.  
They measure the number of top executives on the board instead of the percentage of insiders, 
and find mixed results on the relation between this variable and the magnitude of accounting 
discretion.  They find the magnitude of accruals decreases with the proportion of top executives 
on the board, while earnings smoothness (measured as the volatility of cash flows relative to the 
volatility of earnings) increases with the proportion of top executives on the board.  With respect 
to voluntary disclosure, Byard and Li (2004) find indirect evidence that managers are less able to 
strategically dampen stock prices through disclosure just prior to stock grants (Yermack, 1996; 
Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) when the company’s board has a majority of outside directors.  
Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that managers of firms with greater institutional ownership and outside 
directorship are more likely to issue a management forecast, and that these forecasts are more 
accurate and less optimistic.  Finally, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that in firms with more 
effective board and audit committee structures (where more effective is defined as more 
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independent, expert, larger, and more active), managers are more likely to make or update an 
earnings forecast, and their forecast is more accurate and elicits a more favorable market 
response.  In sum, many studies suggest that outside directors benefit shareholders. 
We add to our understanding on the relation between board characteristics and board 
actions by studying the relation between board independence and Street Earnings, a form of 
voluntary disclosure.  The calculation of Street Earnings involves an interplay between managers 
and analysts.  First, managers choose which expenses to exclude from GAAP when they disclose 
quarterly earnings in the press release. Next, analysts observe management’s choices of 
exclusions but make adjustments to determine Street Earnings by re-inserting some expenses 
(Inclusions).6  Gu and Chen (2004) find that Inclusions are more permanent than the expenses 
excluded by both managers and analysts, and Marques (2005) finds that Inclusions are treated as 
core earnings by equity investors, both consistent with investors following analysts’ 
interpretation of earnings releases.  The portion of manager exclusions that remains after analyst 
adjustments is the focus of our study, because monitoring of management actions that are less 
transparent to outsiders is a critical aspect of board oversight.  Analysts can act as a substitute 
governance mechanism when management exclusions are easily identifiable as recurring 
operating expenses.  Therefore, investigating the relation between board independence and 
exclusions after these analyst adjustments is a fundamental component of our research design. 
By calling a number of investor relations departments and executives of firms with Street 
Exclusions, we confirmed that boards or audit committees of boards review the numbers in 
earnings press releases.  The importance of this review was recently emphasized by its 
                                                 
6
 Ultimately the computation of Street Earnings is not governed by GAAP and the appropriateness of Street 
Exclusions and Inclusions are difficult to verify.  In addition, these Exclusions and Inclusions may not be consistent 
across firms within the same industry or even across time for the same firm.  
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codification in the NYSE Listed Company Manual.7  The audit committees of NYSE listed firms 
are required to “discuss the listed company’s earnings press releases, as well as financial 
information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies (Section 
303A.07(c)).”  Given that boards provide oversight with respect to earnings press releases, we 
argue that the rigor of this oversight, and thus the opportunism present in non-GAAP disclosures, 
can be related to board independence.  That is, more independent boards will act to ensure that 
Street Earnings coincides with the benign explanations offered by managers to justify its 
inclusion in the press release.8   
Several studies argue that managers can use Street Earnings opportunistically to increase 
equity valuations and/or garner private benefits.  For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2004) find 
that Street use increases dramatically when the earnings and stock prices of the respective firms 
start to decline.  Bowen et al. (2005) look at the strategic emphasis placed on Street Earnings by 
managers.  Among other things, they find that managers tend to emphasize the metric that 
portrays better firm performance.  In experimental settings, both Frederickson and Miller (2004) 
and Elliott (2006) find that Street Earnings influence nonprofessional investors and induce them 
to assess a higher stock price for the same firm.  In an analytical setting, Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2003) argue that Street Earnings may also influence investors with limited attention.   
Alternatively, the use of non-GAAP measures need not imply opportunism on the part of 
analysts and managers.  For example, Frankel and Roychowdhury (2005) argue that the 
existence of Street and GAAP earnings reflects the differing demands of clienteles.  The 
                                                 
7
 http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html 
8
 Following much of the prior literature we treat board structure as exogenous.  However, to the extent that board 
structure and disclosure policy are jointly determined, our inferences can be biased.  As noted by Hermalin and 
Weisback (2001, p. 35) theory and evidence on the determinants of board structure are limited.  Research suggests 
firm size and growth are related to board independence.  Thus we control for these characteristics in our tests (Klein, 
2002b; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2003; Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2004). 
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characteristics of an earnings number useful for equity valuation can differ from those of a 
number that minimizes contracting costs.  They find evidence suggesting that alternative 
earnings measures arise in equilibrium.  In sum, empirical evidence exists on both sides of this 
issue.  Thus, we do not claim that Street Earnings are used solely as an opportunistic earnings 
management tool, but simply that opportunism is possible.  
To understand whether managers use exclusions opportunistically, researchers have 
explored the properties of the expenses excluded from Street Earnings.  Doyle et al. (2003) find 
that these excluded expenses are not completely transitory and have future earnings and cash 
flow implications.  To the degree that items are recurring and permanent, they are useful for 
valuation (e.g., Lipe, 1986; Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn, 1996).  Gu and Chen (2004) support 
this point by providing evidence that items excluded by management but re-inserted by analysts 
are more permanent (i.e., more predictive of future earnings).  Based on this logic, our measure 
of an excluded expense’s quality is its ability to predict future earnings.  Expenses excluded by 
management that forecast future earnings are not transitory and are possibly opportunistic in 
nature; prior studies confirm that this is the case on average—excluded expenses are predictive 
of future earnings.  If board independence mitigates this type of behavior, we expect to find 
cross-sectional variation between the degree of exclusion permanence and board independence.9  
Stated in the alternative form, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  Street Exclusions have significantly larger future earnings implications when a 
firm’s board is less independent. 
 
                                                 
9
 We focus on the independence of the board of directors.  In sensitivity tests, we also examine the independence of 
the audit committee.  Results, though slightly weaker, support our general conclusions.  The weaker results likely 
stem from the lower variation in audit committee independence compared to board independence; in Klein (2002a, 
p. 382) the mean audit committee independence was 79.6% while board independence was 58.4%.  Moreover, this 
proportion has increased over time.  In December 1999, the NYSE and NASDAQ modified their requirements for 
audit committees.  Under the new standards, firms must maintain audit committees with at least three independent 
directors (Klein, 2003).  In our sample, mean Audit Committee Independence increased to 90% for 2002 (while the 
board independence mean increased to only 66%). 
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Evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1 does not necessarily indicate opportunism on the 
part of managers.  For example, it could be the case that managers simply make mistakes when 
excluding items (and analysts cannot correct them) because distinguishing between transitory 
and permanent items requires prediction of the future.  If an excluded item’s covariance with 
future earnings is bounded below by zero and unbounded above, then the distribution of 
observed covariances will be skewed and a greater incidence of mistakes could lead to a higher 
mean covariance between exclusions and future earnings.  Furthermore, the difficulty in 
distinguishing the type of exclusion may be related to growth and thus correlated with board 
independence.  Thus, to provide additional evidence of opportunism, we study whether the board 
independence is associated with (1) the use of exclusions to meet analyst expectations, (2) the 
relation between exclusions and future returns, and (3) whether exclusions are associated with 
insider trading. 
Both Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Doyle and Soliman (2005) suggest that managers 
strategically use non-GAAP earnings to exceed the analyst forecast benchmark.  These studies 
find an increase in the use of positive (income-increasing) exclusions when reporting GAAP 
would result in the firm missing the median analyst forecast for the quarter.10  We investigate 
whether the presence of Street Exclusions that allow firms to meet analyst forecasts is related to 
board independence.  Our second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form is: 
Hypothesis 2:  The percentage of firms whose Street Earnings meet analyst forecasts and whose 
GAAP earnings miss analyst forecasts is higher when a firm’s board is less independent. 
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 To exceed analyst expectations, managers can also misclassify core operating expenses as one-time items in the 
year they occur, since one-time items tend to be excluded from analyst forecasts.  McVay (2006) finds that 
managers misclassify more core expenses as “special” when doing so allows them to meet the analyst forecasts they 
would otherwise miss. 
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The correlation documented by Doyle et al. (2003) between abnormal returns in the years 
following the earnings announcement and Street Exclusions suggests that markets are slow to 
incorporate information contained in Street Exclusions.11  This could occur because investors are 
predisposed to fixate on Street Earnings even though managers are excluding valuation-relevant 
items from this non-GAAP performance metric (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).  Thus investors 
gradually update their expectations as firm performance is realized.  The correlation between 
exclusions and future returns implies that financial reporting related to Street Exclusions lacks 
transparency.  If more independent boards better protect shareholders from misleading or noisy 
disclosures, thereby increasing the transparency of reported numbers, then we would expect the 
correlation between Street Earnings and future returns to be weakened when boards are more 
independent.  Therefore our third hypothesis, stated in the alternative form is: 
Hypothesis 3:  Street Exclusions have larger future abnormal return implications when a firm’s 
board is less independent. 
 
Seemingly opportunistic behavior by management can actually be beneficial to 
shareholders.  For example, earnings management that forestalls the violation of debt covenants 
can transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders.  We would not expect boards to curtail 
managerial behavior that benefits shareholders.  In our case, if the exclusion of permanent items 
were not costly to shareholders we would not expect such exclusions to be limited by board 
actions.  Therefore, we examine a possible cost to shareholders:  insider trading on the basis of 
Street Exclusions.  Insider trading activity after the announcement of Street Earnings related to 
the permanence of Street Exclusions suggests managerial opportunism in the use of exclusions.  
For example, envision a manager who wants to maximize the proceeds from a stock sale after an 
                                                 
11
 The correlation between exclusions and an unidentified risk factor is another possible explanation for the ability 
of exclusions to explain future returns. 
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earnings announcement.12  Given that the market is slow to incorporate information in Street 
Exclusions, the manager has an incentive to exclude expenses from Street Earnings.  Such 
incentives can lead to the exclusion of expenses even if they are not transitory.  Thus, 
opportunistic behavior by managers suggests that the magnitude of insider trading activity after 
the earnings announcement will be related to the future earnings implications of exclusions.  
Therefore our fourth hypothesis, stated in the alternative form is: 
Hypothesis 4:  The association between the magnitude of insider trading activity and the future 
earnings implications of Street Exclusions is stronger when a firm’s board is less 
independent. 
 
We define Street Earnings as the I/B/E/S-reported actual earnings per share (Bradshaw 
and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Doyle et al., 2003; Collins, Li and Xie, 2005).  
Prior research (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2002; Gu and Chen, 2004) finds that forecast data 
providers such as I/B/E/S occasionally adjust the earnings number disclosed in the press release  
(Inclusions) to ensure compatibility with earnings forecasts made by a majority of the analysts 
following the firm.  Gu and Chen (2004) examine these Inclusions and find that the analysts re-
insert the most persistent exclusions back into actual earnings.  By making these adjustments, 
analysts can reverse some of the more opportunistic exclusions of managers.  If more 
independent boards limit managerial opportunism, then analysts will make fewer adjustments 
(i.e., reinsert fewer items) when boards are more independent.  However, managers are an 
important source of information on nonrecurring items (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993).  Thus differentiating between exclusions that are more permanent and those 
that are less permanent will be costly for analysts, particularly when their purpose conflicts with 
management intentions.  To better understand analysts’ tendencies to re-insert exclusions as 
                                                 
12
 We focus on trading that occurs after the earnings announcement because most company policies prohibit sales 
prior to the earnings announcement (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon, 2000). 
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board independence varies we use the First Call Footnote file to isolate analyst adjustments to 
the earnings disclosed in the press release and test the following hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative form): 
Hypothesis 5: The magnitude of analyst reversals of exclusions is decreasing in board 
independence. 
  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Sample 
 Our empirical tests employ data from several sources.  Financial statement data are 
obtained from the Compustat quarterly database, quarterly Street Earnings are obtained from the 
split-unadjusted I/B/E/S database, board of director independence information comes from the 
Investor Research Responsibility Center’s (IRRC) corporate governance dataset, and price 
information is obtained from CRSP.  Finally, insider-trading data are obtained from Thomson 
Financial.  Our sample period covers all firm quarters with available data across Compustat, 
I/B/E/S and IRRC for the period 1988 to 2002.13  These criteria yield a final sample size of 
75,875 firm-quarter observations.  The number of observations in any particular test will vary 
depending on the availability of data necessary for the particular test.  Finally, to test our final 
hypothesis, we create a subsample that examines the items added back by analysts (Inclusions).  
To this end, we use the March 2003 version of the First Call Historical Database covering the 
period 1990–2003.14  Our sample selection process is identical to that of Gu and Chen (2004).  
Merging this data with our existing sample yields a new sample size of 8,306 firm-quarter 
observations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13
 IRRC data covers 1997 to 2002; we require that included firms have at least one year of IRRC data. 
14
 We are grateful to Zhaoyang Gu for providing us with these data. 
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3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1   
 
Street Earnings 
To form Street Earnings and Exclusions, we begin by computing the Street Exclusions 
implied by the Street Earnings number. We use the I/B/E/S split-unadjusted database to ensure 
that the EPS figure is the actual EPS originally reported.15  This makes the I/B/E/S figures 
directly comparable to the Compustat figures, which are recorded at the historically reported 
amounts.  I/B/E/S flags whether the reported Street Earnings per share number is basic or diluted.  
GAAP earnings are defined as earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, using either basic (Compustat data item #19) or diluted (data item #9), depending on 
the I/B/E/S basic/diluted flag.  The difference between Street Earnings and GAAP earnings is 
defined as Street Exclusions:  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – GAAP earnings.  When 
Street Earnings are higher than GAAP earnings, Street Exclusions are positive, indicating that the 
average exclusion is an expense.   
 
3.2.2   
 
Corporate Governance 
 
Our corporate governance metric is the proportion of outside directors on the board.16  
Many potential corporate governance metrics exist (for example, see Larcker et al., 2004; Brown 
and Caylor, 2004).17  However, board and audit committee independence has been used 
extensively in prior examinations of corporate governance and fraud and earnings management 
                                                 
15
 Baber and Kang (2002) and Payne and Thomas (2003) show that the I/B/E/S’s split-adjustment, coupled with 
I/B/E/S’s rounding, can lead to erroneous inferences.  We use I/B/E/S split-unadjusted data to avoid this problem. 
16
 The definition of director independence varies depending on the exchange.  For NYSE firms, independence 
requires that the director 1) does not have a material relationship with the company, 2) cannot have been an 
employee for 5 years, 3) cannot have been an employee of the company’s auditor for five years, 4) cannot have been 
an interlocking director (i.e., an executive of company A serves on the compensation committee of B and an 
executive of company B serves on the board of company A), and 5) cannot have an immediate family member who 
has met any of these disqualifications.  The NASDAQ and NYSE rules are similar. 
17
 The general consensus from these papers is that corporate governance is multifaceted.  However, the data used in 
both of these studies is new and the analyses are thus limited to the years 2002–2004.  Alternatively, Bowen et al. 
(2004) use the G-Score developed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) as their main corporate governance metric. 
We do not use a metric of “shareholder rights,” but rather focus on financial reporting oversight. 
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(Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002a).  Moreover, both the SEC and the major 
stock exchanges impose board independence requirements, indicating that this is an important 
aspect of corporate governance.  For example, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ now require a 
majority of outside directors on the board of directors, and under Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 301, 
all audit committee members must be independent (see also Klein, 2003).  
To examine years prior to the start of IRRC data (i.e., prior to 1997), we assign the first 
year of available data to all preceding years.  For example, a firm with IRRC data beginning in 
1999 has the percentage of board independence in 1999 as the board independence percentage 
from 1988 to 1998.  We also present results using only those firm years for which we have IRRC 
data, limiting these results to a subset of firms from 1997 to 2002. 
We measure board independence several ways including the continuous percentage, the 
quartile rank, and an indicator variable indicating that a firm has an “independent” board if the 
majority of the directors are independent.  We present the decile of independence (ranked by 
year) in our tables; however, our fundamental conclusions are insensitive to these alternate 
specifications. 
 
3.2.3 Other Variables 
As in Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Guay (1999) we employ common factor analysis to 
construct a single variable (Growth) that captures variation common to Book-to-MarketAssets, 
R&D, Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures.  Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book 
value of equity divided by the book value of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the 
quarter (data item #60 / [data item #181 + (data item #61 ×  data item #14)]).  R&D is calculated 
as R&D expense divided by the market value of assets (data item #46 / [data item #181 + (data 
item #61 ×  data item #14)]).  Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q – 4 to q (data 
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item #2).  Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value 
of assets (data item #30 / [data item #181 + (data item #61 ×  data item #14)]).18  We examine 
three additional variables in addition to Growth.  Analysts is the number of analysts following the 
firm in year t.  Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if quarterly GAAP earnings (data 
item #25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Finally, Earnings Volatility is the standard 
deviation of return on assets (data item #25 divided by data item #44) over the preceding eight 
quarters. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Referring to Table 1, the mean percentage of board independence is 62.3%.  Klein 
(2002a, 2002b), in her hand-collected sample of S&P 500 firms from 1992 to 1993, finds that 
outsiders, on average, make up 58.4% of the board.  Thus outsider representation has increased 
slightly over time.  Street Earnings per share (GAAP earnings per share) is $0.44 ($0.40).  This 
is larger than the per-share figures reported by Doyle et al. (2003) of $0.29 ($0.26).  The 
difference is consistent with IRRC covering larger, more profitable firms.  Consistent with prior 
literature, Street Earnings per share tends to exceed GAAP earnings per share.  Total Street 
Exclusions average $0.04.  Our factor score for growth has a mean of zero by construction. 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics by independence quartile.  Firms with high 
proportions of outsiders tend to have lower (scaled) Street Earnings per share, GAAP earnings 
per share, and Future GAAP earnings per share, as well as more recorded assets, lower growth 
and a higher number of analysts following the firm.  Thus, growth firms tend to have less 
                                                 
18
 We replicate each of our results using the alternative growth controls of the book-to-market ratio and quarter-
over-year ago quarter sales growth.  Results are similar.  We also consider the age of the firm as potential correlated 
omitted variable.  Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the age of the firm. 
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independent boards, consistent with growth firms facing higher uncertainty and complexity and 
therefore requiring board members with specialized knowledge of the firm (Klein, 2002b). 
Table 3 displays the correlation between our variables.  Referring to the Pearson 
correlations in the upper right, GAAP and Street Earnings are correlated at 0.83.  Street 
Exclusions and Street Earnings are negatively correlated consistent with exclusions including 
special items, which are more likely to occur when performance is poor (e.g., Elliott and Shaw, 
1988; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1994).  Consistent with managers’ arguments in 
support of presenting non-GAAP measures, Street Earnings appears to be more highly correlated 
with Future GAAP earnings than current GAAP earnings (0.68 versus 0.63), and Street 
Exclusions are positively associated with both the existence of a loss and earnings volatility.  
Finally, board independence is positively associated with the magnitude of Street Exclusions, 
consistent with larger firms, with more assets and lower profitability, having more independent 
boards; the table does not shed light on cross-sectional variation in the quality of Street 
Exclusions. 
 In Table 4 we present sample size and board independence statistics by industry.19  Our 
sample has the highest number of observations in Heavy Industry, and the lowest in Agriculture.  
The Utility (Apparel) industry has the highest (lowest) mean and median proportion of outside 
directors on the board.  These realizations are consistent with firms requiring board members to 
have more firm-specific knowledge in the apparel industry than in utilities (Klein, 2002b).  
While apparel companies must move quickly to capitalize on changing consumer preferences, 
utility companies are more apt to focus on long-term trends. 
 
4. Research Design and Test Results 
                                                 
19
 Industry classifications are based on Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002). 
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4.1    Future GAAP Earnings 
 Our first hypothesis posits that lower independence percentages imply Street Exclusions 
have greater future-earnings implications.  We investigate the prediction of next year’s GAAP 
earnings, measured as the sum of quarters q + 1 through q + 4, by estimating the following 
regression equation: 
 
Future GAAP earningsq+1, q+4 = γ0 + γ1Street Earningsq + γ2Street Exclusionsq +  
γ3Independence Decilet + γ4Street Exclusionsq × Independence Decilet  
+ Control Variables + υq+1, q+4. (1) 
 
Estimating equation (1) in a pooled regression poses serious econometric problems because 
observations occur each quarter while the dependent variable aggregates over four quarters.  
Consequently, the dependent variable overlaps between observations.  To control for this 
problem we estimate equation (1) separately for each quarter and report the mean of the resulting 
coefficient estimates.  We then compute a t-statistic based on the quarterly estimates (similar to 
Fama and MacBeth, 1973), multiplying the traditional standard error by the Newey-West 
adjustment (Newey and West, 1987) to account for possible serial correlation in the quarterly 
estimates.20   
Because all variables are denominated in dollars and scaled by total assets, the 
coefficients in equation (1) can be interpreted as the future-dollar-earnings implication of a dollar 
change in the unscaled independent variable.  If the excluded expenses are irrelevant, non-
recurring, and have no future GAAP earnings consequences, then the coefficient on Street 
                                                 
20
 The Newey-West adjustment is discussed in Verbeek (2000, p. 104).  The correction multiplies the traditional 
standard error by NW , where 
=
+
−+=
n
i
i
n
iNW
1
)
1
1(1 ρ .  The variable ρi is the autocorrelation at lag i and n is 
the number of lags that are expected to be autocorrelated.  We set n equal to the number of overlapping periods in 
each test (i.e., n=3). 
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Exclusions in (1) (i.e., γ2) should be zero.  However, based on prior research, we expect this 
coefficient to be negative, indicating that a portion of Street Exclusions represents recurring 
expenses (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004; McVay, 2006).  The estimated coefficient 
of interest in this regression is γ4.  If Street Exclusions of firms with more independent boards are 
of higher quality than the average Street Exclusion, we expect γ4 to be positive, countering the 
expected negative coefficient on γ2.21 
 Results are presented in Table 5.  The first column of results does not include the 
independence variable or interaction term.  The coefficient on Street Earnings is 3.37.  4.0 is the 
expected coefficient when earnings are completely permanent, given that future GAAP earnings 
is the sum of four quarters.  As expected, γ2 is negative and significant.22  Essentially, one dollar 
in quarterly Street Exclusions implies future expenses over the subsequent four quarters of $1.11.  
Though clearly less than 4.0 (the expected coefficient for a permanent dollar of earnings), the 
results are consistent with prior literature—while Street Exclusions are less permanent than 
included expenses (1.11 < 3.34), they are not entirely transitory (Doyle et al., 2003; Gu and 
Chen, 2004).   
Next, we explore whether the Street Exclusions are more transitory when the firm has a 
greater proportion of outsider board representation.  Consistent with Hypothesis One, γ4, in the 
second column of Table 5, is positive and significant (γ4 = 0.10).  The association between Street 
Exclusions and future earnings is lower when the board is more independent.  In addition, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21
 An alternative explanation to this result is that some types of firms tend to exclude expenses that are more 
permanent in nature (e.g., amortization expense) and that these firms are systematically related to board 
independence (i.e., there is a correlated omitted variable that explains our result).  In unreported tests, we check 
whether the autocorrelation of exclusions varies with board independence and find no significant correlation.  In 
other words, it is the “quality” of the exclusion, not simply the type of exclusion that varies with board 
independence. 
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result suggests analyst adjustments do not completely offset the effects of board independence on 
the permanence of Street Exclusions.  Our result is consistent with that of Gu and Chen (2004) 
and Doyle et al. (2003), who find that exclusions contain a non-transitory component even after 
analysts have the opportunity to make adjustments.  Taken together, these findings are 
compelling because they suggest that I/B/E/S analysts cannot easily identify the remaining 
exclusions as opportunistic.  After analysts strip out the most egregious exclusions, the 
remaining exclusions continue to vary in quality, and this quality varies with board 
independence. 
For intuition on the economic significance of this finding, consider firms in the top decile 
of board independence (deciles of board independence range from zero to nine).  The Street 
Exclusions of these firms are expected to be associated with lower future GAAP earnings of 
$0.67 (–1.57 + 0.10× 9), compared to $1.57 for firms in the lowest decile of board independence; 
earnings implications are lower by more than one-half.     
In the third column of Table 5, we include the decile rank of several control variables.  
Recall from Table 3 that board independence and size (the log of total assets) are positively 
correlated (see also Klein, 2002a, 2002b).  Also, the costs to opportunistic behavior can increase 
with size, as shareholders are more likely to sue larger firms (Francis, Philbrick and Schipper, 
1994).  Therefore, we include the log of total assets.  Next, growth can also act as a correlated-
omitted variable if it is correlated with the persistence of Street Exclusions.  Results in Table 2 
(and Klein, 2002b) clearly indicate that high growth firms tend to have less independent boards.  
Accordingly, we include the Growth factor described in Section 3.   We also control for the 
number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm.  As analyst following increases, forecast 
                                                                                                                                                             
22
 Recall that our definition of Street Exclusions gives excluded losses a positive sign and excluded gains a negative 
sign. 
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providers will be more likely to establish rules for the inclusion or exclusion of items to ensure 
cross-analyst consistency.  Thus, the number of analysts forming the consensus can be related to 
differences between earnings reported by managers and actual numbers provided by I/B/E/S.  
Some firms, such as loss firms and firms with high earnings volatility, may have less persistent 
earnings (e.g., Hayn, 1995; Dichev and Tang, 2005) and appear more likely to have Street 
Exclusions (Table 3 herein; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).  Thus, we include an indicator 
variable for loss firms, as well as each firm’s historical earnings volatility.  We also interact each 
of the above five variables with exclusions.  Finally, we include the industry indicator variables 
from Fama and French (1997).  Results are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables 
and interactions.   
In the final three columns of Table 5, we estimate the same three regression 
specifications using only those observations that had board data in the firm-quarter observation 
year.  This restriction limits the sample to a subset of firms from 1997 to 2002, less than one 
third of the original sample.  Results are similar to those in the first three columns. 
The existence of Street Exclusions may simply indicate lower earnings persistence.  
Although we include control variables such as loss and earnings volatility above, we also present 
a second set of regressions (for both the extrapolated and actual board independence samples) for 
only those firm-quarter observations with non-zero Street Exclusions.  Results from this 
alternative specification are presented in Table 6.  Overall, the empirical results are similar to 
those in Table 5. 
     
4.2 Exceeding Analyst Forecasts   
Our second hypothesis concerns whether board independence is associated with the 
incidence of “benchmark-beating” exclusions.  We consider a firm whose GAAP earnings fall 
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below the consensus analyst forecast, but whose Street Earnings meet or exceed this benchmark 
to have “benchmark-beating” exclusions.  Although we recognize that analysts do not forecast 
GAAP earnings, several studies have shown that exceeding analyst forecasts provides a strong 
incentive for managers to exclude expenses from earnings (e.g., Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; 
Doyle and Soliman, 2005; McVay, 2006). We expect greater board independence to be 
associated with a reduction in the incidence of “benchmark-beating” exclusions.  We estimate a 
logistic regression in Table 7, using the following model: 
 
Benchmark Beatingq = γ0 + γ1Independence Decilet + γ2Log of Total Assetsq +  
γ3Growthq + γ4Analystst + γ5Lossq + γ6Earnings Volatilityq + εq       (2) 
 
Benchmark Beating is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings fall 
below the median analyst forecast, but Street Earnings meet or exceed the median forecast, and 
(are) zero otherwise.  A negative coefficient on Independence Decile is consistent with board 
independence, reducing the likelihood that Street Exclusions enabled the manager to meet the 
analyst forecast.  Referring to Table 7, when examining the entire population from 1988 to 2002, 
a higher independence decile decreases the likelihood of meeting the analyst forecast using 
Street Earnings, but missing the analyst forecast using GAAP earnings.  This result strengthens 
when only observations with non-zero exclusions are used.  Turning to the samples for the 1997 
to 2002 time period, Independence Decile is not significant when examining all firms, but again 
is strongly significant when examining only those firms with non-zero exclusions.  Overall, these 
results support the joint hypothesis that 1) Street Exclusions arise, in part, from managers’ 
attempts to meet the analyst forecast, and 2) board independence mitigates this behavior.23 
                                                 
23
 One might question why boards prevent managers from using exclusions to meet the analyst forecast.  One 
possibility is that managers obtain personal benefits from doing so, such as obtaining a larger bonus (Matsunaga and 
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4.3 Future Returns 
To test our third hypothesis we examine whether the relation between Street Exclusions 
and subsequent returns varies with board independence.  We estimate the following regression 
equation: 
 
Returnst+1 = γ0 + γ1 Street Exclusionsq + γ2 Independence Decilet   
+ γ3 Street Exclusionsq ×  Independence Decilet + γ4 Book to Marketq  
+ γ5 Log of MVEq + γ6 Betaq + γ7 Accrualsq + γ8 Momentumq + υt+1                         (3) 
 
Future abnormal returns (Returnst+1) are calculated as annual buy-and-hold returns 
(inclusive of dividends and other distributions) less the value-weighted market index for the 
same period.  They are computed beginning two days after the announcement date.  For firms 
that delist during the future return period we calculate the remaining return by taking CRSP’s 
delisting return and then reinvesting the proceeds in the value-weighted market portfolio.  For 
firms that delist due to poor performance (delisting codes 500 and 520–584), we use a –35% 
delisting return for NYSE/AMEX firms and a –55% delisting return for NASDAQ firms, as 
recommended in Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999).  
To control for the possibility that our return regressions are simply capturing differential 
risk across the portfolios or a previously documented market anomaly, we include multiple 
control variables.  The risk controls are Betaq, estimated using weekly returns over the two years 
prior to the end of fiscal quarter q, Log of MVEq, defined as the log of the market value of equity 
at the end of fiscal quarter q (#61 × #14), and Book-to-Marketq, constructed as the book value of 
equity (#60) at the end of fiscal quarter q divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
fiscal-quarter q (see Fama and French, 1993 for a discussion of each risk control).  We control 
                                                                                                                                                             
Park, 2001) or selling their shares at potentially inflated prices (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004).  We 
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for the accruals anomaly (Sloan, 1996) by adding Accrualsq as an independent variable computed 
as GAAP earnings per share (data item #19) minus cash from operations per share (data item 
#108 divided by data item #44), scaled by assets per share at the end of fiscal quarter.  Finally, 
we control for Momentumq, calculated as the market-adjusted stock return for the six months 
prior to the earnings announcement (see Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996).  Following 
Bernard and Thomas (1990), we transform each of the independent variables to its scaled-decile 
rank by quarter for ease of interpretation of coefficient estimates.  
We present results for each of our four samples in Table 8.  The first column of results is 
over all firms from 1988 to 2002.  Consistent with Doyle et al. (2003), we find Street Exclusions 
are negatively associated with future abnormal returns (γ1 = –0.12).  Consistent with Hypothesis 
3, we find future abnormal negative returns are declining in board independence (γ3 = 0.08).  We 
replicate these regressions using the sample from 1997 to 2002 and find similar results.  
Referring to the final two columns of results, however, results are significantly weaker when we 
exclude observations with zero Street Exclusions.  Overall, we find limited evidence that board 
independence increases the transparency of Street Exclusions.   
 
4.4 Insider Trading 
To test our fourth hypothesis, we examine whether board independence reduces the 
relation between insider trading and the permanence of Street Exclusions.  In Table 9 we 
examine the association between the persistence of Street Exclusions and the magnitude of 
insider trading, and whether this association varies with board independence.  Specifically, we 
estimate the following regressions: 
                                                                                                                                                             
investigate these incentives in subsequent tests. 
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Future GAAP earningsq+1, q+4 = γ0 + γ1 Street Earningsq + γ2 Street Exclusionsq  
+ γ3 Abs(Insider Trading) Decileq + γ4 Street Exclusionsq × Abs(Insider Trading)Decileq  
+ υq+1, q+4                                                                                                                                                                                      (4a) 
 
 Future GAAP earningsq+1, q+4 = γ0 + γ1 Street Earningsq + γ2 Street Exclusionsq  
+ γ3 Abs(Insider Trading) Decileq + γ4 Street Exclusionsq × Abs(Insider Trading) 
Decileq + γ5 Independence Decilet + γ6 Street Exclusionsq × Abs(Insider Trading) 
Decileq ×  Independence Decilet + υq+1, q+4 (4b) 
 
where Abs(Insider Trading) Decile is the decile rank of the absolute value of managerial insider 
trades occurring from the day following the earnings announcement through the end of the 
quarter, calculated as [ 
==
HI
hi
,
1,1
(SSih / SHih) – 
==
HI
hi
,
1,1
(SPih / SHih)] where SSih, SPih, and SHih 
are shares sold in the open market, purchased in the open market, and held by officer i for each 
post-announcement trade h for the given firm in the given quarter.  Referring to the first column 
of Table 9, which presents regression equation (4a) for all firms from 1988 to 1999,24 γ4 is not 
statistically different from zero, indicating that Street Exclusions are no more permanent (i.e., of 
lower quality) when insiders trade more. 
 In the second column of results, which presents regression equation (4b) for all firms 
from 1988 to 1999, γ4 is negative and significant after controlling for board independence.  In 
other words, once the exclusions are able to vary by board independence, Street Exclusions are 
more permanent (i.e., of lower quality) when insiders in firms with low board independence 
trade more.  Further, γ6 is positive and significant, indicating that the above association is weaker 
in firms with higher board independence.  This finding supports the notion that while managers’ 
trading activity is associated with the future earnings implications of Street Exclusions, this 
relation is diminished in firms with higher board independence. 
                                                 
24
 Our insider trading data is only available through the first quarter of 2000.   
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Although not shown, these findings are similar if we include the multiple control 
variables in Tables 5 and 6.  For example, regression equation (4b) yields coefficients of γ4 = –
0.03 (t = –1.51) and γ6 = 0.01 (t = 2.53) when estimated using all of the control variables.  
Moreover, results are generally consistent in the three alternate sub-samples, though the 
coefficient on γ4 is insignificant or weakly significant when the sample period is confined to the 
years 1997 to 1999, suggesting that insiders are less apt to trade on the basis of exclusions in 
more recent periods (or alternately, that these regressions lack power).  Overall, the results 
support the notion that board independence reduces opportunism related to the permanence of 
Street Exclusions. 
 
 
4.5  Street Earnings, Analyst Adjustments, and Board Independence 
Next, we investigate the relation between Inclusions and board independence  Inclusions 
are income statement items that were excluded by managers when calculating non-GAAP 
earnings in the press release but included in actual earnings by First Call analysts.  For 
consistency with our other tests we give net income-reducing items a positive sign.  In 
untabulated univariate tests, we find that they are negatively correlated (–0.045; p-value = 
0.0001) with board independence.  Thus, all else equal, First Call is less likely to restore to 
earnings exclusions made by managers of firms with more independent boards.   
In Table 10, we present the results of a regression of Inclusions (a continuous variable 
scaled by total assets per share) on board independence and control variables.  The results are 
consistent with the simple correlation above.  In all models Inclusions are significantly 
negatively related to board independence.  This result suggests that managers of firms with more 
independent boards behave less opportunistically in their choice of exclusions, and (consistent 
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with results in Gu and Chen,2004) that First Call analysts need to be less active to reverse these 
exclusions when boards are more independent. 25 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we explore the relation between board independence and disclosure.  We 
focus on board independence, as the economic importance of this facet of corporate governance 
remains an open question in the academic literature and because the NYSE stock exchange, the 
SEC, and the financial press have shown a keen interest in board independence.  Further, per our 
conversations with company officials, the boards or audit committees often review earnings 
press releases and thus have the means to affect earnings disclosures.  We focus on Street 
Earnings, and examine the characteristics of the income or expenses included in GAAP earnings, 
but excluded from Street Earnings (i.e., Street Exclusions).  We have reason to believe that board 
independence is linked to the characteristics of Street Earnings—a number whose computation is 
associated with less regulatory guidance and auditor oversight.  In addition, because Street 
Earnings are subject to adjustment by analysts, they provide a variable that allows us to examine 
the ability of analysts to counteract the effects of opportunistic disclosures by managers.   
Our findings reject the null hypothesis of no relation between the characteristics of Street 
Exclusions and board independence.  We find that Street Exclusions are more strongly related to 
future earnings when board independence is low.  Further, we find that Street Exclusions that 
allow Street Earnings to beat analyst forecasts when GAAP earnings would not occur more 
frequently when board independence is low.  We also find some evidence that subsequent 
                                                 
25
 An alternative test approach is to examine an indicator variable for whether or not the First Call analysts re-
inserted any managerial exclusions into core earnings (rather than examining the magnitude).  We replicate our 
analysis using an indicator variable approach and results are similar.  For example, for the first column of results, the 
coefficient on board independence is –0.033 (Pr < X2 = 0.025). 
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negative abnormal returns associated with Street Exclusions are less pronounced in firms where 
board independence is high, and that insider trading is more weakly associated with the 
permanence of Street Exclusions when board independence is high.  Finally, our results suggest 
that analysts reverse more exclusions as boards become less independent. 
These tests provide insight into how corporate governance (measured by board 
independence) shapes disclosure, given analyst oversight.  This question is relevant, given 
regulatory concerns about the potential for non-GAAP earnings to mislead investors, and the 
focus by regulators on independent boards and analyst activities.  Our results suggest that board 
independence affects voluntary earnings-related disclosure despite analyst intervention.   
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Percent Board 
Independence 62.3% 17.9% 28.6% 50.0% 64.3% 76.9% 87.5% 
Street Earnings per share 0.44 0.44 –0.13 0.19 0.37 0.63 1.26 
GAAP earnings per share 0.40 0.54 –0.33 0.16 0.35 0.63 1.30 
Street Exclusions per share 0.04 0.26 –0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 
Future GAAP 1.64 1.98 –1.20 0.67 1.50 2.53 4.97 
Total Assets 6,275 19,134 76 304 1,007 3,955 27,914 
Growth 0.00 0.07 –0.04 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.15 
Analysts 6.65 5.04 1.00 3.00 5.00 9.00 17.00 
Loss 0.117 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnings Volatility 0.013 0.018 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.014 0.046 
Surprise 0.00 0.13 –0.19 –0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 
 
The full sample consists of 75,875 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2002. All income numbers (including 
Surprise) are reported here on a per-share basis, but are scaled by total assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter in 
all statistical tests.  The variables are defined as follows: Street Earnings is the I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per 
share.  GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – GAAP earnings.  
Future GAAP is GAAP earnings per share, as defined above, summed for 4 quarters starting with quarter q+1.  Total 
Assets (#44) is measured at the end of quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical tests.  Growth is 
obtained using common factor analysis on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, Sales Growth, and 
Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book value of debt plus 
market value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense 
divided by the market value of assets (#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q–4 
to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value of assets 
(#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm. Loss is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Earnings volatility is the standard 
deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters. Surprise is Street Earnings – I/B/E/S 
forecast, the most recent median forecast preceding the earnings announcement date.  Percent Board Independence is the 
percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The earliest year of available 
board data is extrapolated to all preceding years.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics by Board Independence Quartiles 
 
Descriptive Values Board Independence Quartiles 
Mean (above) Median (below) 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 (highest) 
0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 Street Earnings per share 
0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 
0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 GAAP earnings per share 
0.015 0.014 0.012 0.010 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 Street Exclusions per share 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.069 0.061 0.053 0.046 Future GAAP  
0.064 0.055 0.046 0.040 
4,246.9 5,067.3 7,488.9 8,290.2 Total Assets 
547.4 762.7 1,320.4 1,918.8 
0.043 0.037 0.030 0.023 Growth  
0.029 0.022 0.014 0.010 
6.02 6.43 6.93 7.21 Analysts  
5.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 
0.114 0.120 0.114 0.121 Loss  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.013 0.014 0.013 0.012 Earnings Volatility 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 
–0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 Surprise 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
37.3% 57.6% 70.6% 83.4% Board Independence 
40.0% 57.1% 71.4% 83.3% 
 
The full sample consists of 75,875 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2002. All income numbers (excluding Surprise) 
are scaled by total assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter.  The variables are defined as follows: Street Earnings is 
the I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share.  GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched 
to the I/B/E/S definition) before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street 
Earnings – GAAP earnings.  Future GAAP is GAAP earnings per share, as defined above, summed for 4 quarters starting 
with quarter q+1.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the end of quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical 
tests.  Growth is obtained using common factor analysis on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, Sales 
Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book value 
of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D 
expense divided by the market value of assets (#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from 
quarter q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value of assets 
(#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Earnings volatility is the standard 
deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters.  Surprise is Street Earnings – I/B/E/S 
forecast, the most recent median forecast preceding the earnings announcement date.  Board Independence is the percent of 
board members that are independent in the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The earliest year of available board data is 
extrapolated to all preceding years.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Table - (Pearson above the diagonal and Spearman below) 
 
 
 
Percent 
Board 
Indep. 
Street 
EPS 
GAAP 
EPS 
Street 
Excl-
usions 
Future 
GAAP 
EPS 
Log of 
Total 
Assets Growth Analysts Loss 
Earnings 
Volatility Surprise 
            
 –0.103 –0.084 0.007 –0.107 0.225 –0.129 0.105 0.010 –0.033 0.002 Percent Board 
Indep.  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0561) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0041) (0.0001) (0.6245) 
              
–0.120  0.829 –0.045 0.683 –0.218 0.369 0.099 –0.459 –0.036 0.097 Street EPS (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
              
–0.121 0.910  –0.555 0.634 –0.146 0.326 0.059 –0.623 –0.121 0.087 GAAP EPS (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
              
0.036 –0.024 –0.283  –0.139 –0.027 –0.068 0.051 0.455 0.145 0.008 Street Exclusions (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 0.0272 
              
–0.140 0.730 0.713 –0.118  –0.194 0.290 0.047 –0.346 –0.087 0.039 Future GAAP EPS (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
              
0.241 –0.318 –0.299 0.044 –0.315  –0.268 0.522 –0.074 –0.295 0.011 Log of Total Assets (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) 
              
–0.162 0.453 0.440 –0.091 0.407 –0.329  –0.037 –0.168 0.046 0.042 Growth (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 
      
    
   
0.105 0.072 0.045 0.068 0.031 0.528 –0.029  –0.038 –0.050 0.007 Analysts (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0423) 
              
0.012 –0.425 –0.558 0.300 –0.310 –0.072 –0.188 –0.049  0.241 –0.060 Loss  (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
              
–0.058 0.159 0.114 0.064 0.123 –0.400 0.118 –0.074 0.236  –0.018 Earnings Volatility (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
              
–0.009 0.313 0.274 0.034 0.248 –0.087 0.244 –0.008 –0.163 0.104  Surprise (0.0099) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0286) (0.0001) (0.0001)  
            
 
There are a maximum of 75,875 firm-quarter observations from 1988 to 2002.  The variables are defined as follows, with all income numbers scaled by assets per share at the end of the 
fiscal quarter:  Street EPS is the I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share.  GAAP EPS is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street EPS – GAAP EPS.  Future GAAP EPS is GAAP Earnings per share, as defined above, summed for 
4 quarters starting with quarter q+1.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the end of quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical tests.  Growth is obtained using common factor 
analysis on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book 
value of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense divided by the market value of assets 
(#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value of 
assets (#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than 
zero, and zero otherwise.  Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters.  Surprise is Street EPS – I/B/E/S forecast, 
the most recent median forecast preceding the earnings announcement date.  Percent Board Independence is the percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal year 
containing quarter q.  The earliest year of available board data is extrapolated to all preceding years.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 4 
Percentage of Board Independence by Industry  
 
Industry Name # of Obs Mean Median 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  172 63.1% 71.4% 
Mining and Construction  1,408 63.1% 70.0% 
Food and Tobacco  2,200 60.1% 60.0% 
Textile and Apparel  1,363 49.9% 50.0% 
Lumber, Furniture, Paper Printing  4,054 63.0% 64.3% 
Chemicals 2,687 67.8% 70.0% 
Refining and Extractive  3,017 63.7% 66.7% 
Heavy Industry—Rubber, Leather, Concrete, Metal, 
Machinery, Manufacturing  16,091 65.3% 66.7% 
Computers, Semiconductors, And Computer 
Services  8,905 60.6% 62.5% 
Transport, Pipelines, Telecom  3,694 57.0% 57.1% 
Utilities 5,667 72.3% 73.3% 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants  8,711 56.4% 57.1% 
Services 4,741 56.1% 56.3% 
Banks and Insurance  10,444 63.6% 66.7% 
Drugs and Medical Equipment 2,721 61.2% 66.7% 
Total: 75,875   
 
There are a total of 75,875 observations.  Board Independence is the percent of board members that are independent in 
the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The earliest year of available board data is extrapolated to all preceding years.  
Industry classifications are based on Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002). 
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TABLE 5 – Quarterly Regressions of Future GAAP on Street Exclusions  
  Dependent Variable:  Future GAAP earnings 
Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) 
Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 1988–2002 1997–2002 
Intercept  0.01 (4.09) 
0.01 
(6.18) 
0.04 
(11.12) 
–0.003 
(–1.23) 
0.001 
(0.68) 
0.03 
(5.90) 
Street Earnings (+) 3.37 (58.79) 
3.35 
(58.30) 
3.33 
(63.71) 
3.62 
(32.63) 
3.61 
(32.49) 
3.57 
(32.68) 
Street Exclusions (–) –1.11 (–5.98) 
–1.57 
(–6.49) 
–2.02 
(–4.48) 
–0.90 
(–5.16) 
–1.23  
(–6.03) 
–1.37 
(–1.77) 
Independence Decile   –0.001 (–11.10) 
–0.001 
(–7.16)  
–0.001 
(–8.35) 
–0.001 
(–7.90) 
Street Excl. ×  Indep. 
Decile (+)  
0.10 
(3.82) 
0.07 
(2.98)  
0.08 
(3.79) 
0.07 
(2.47) 
Log of Total Assets    –0.003 (–11.70)   
–0.002 
(–6.32) 
Growth    –0.002 (–4.25)   
–0.003 
(–2.97) 
Analysts    0.001 (6.31)   
0.001 
(3.70) 
Loss 
 
  
0.006 
(1.54)   
–0.01 
(–1.79) 
Earnings Volatility 
 
  
–0.001 
(–4.50)   
–0.002 
(–4.16) 
Log of Assets ×  
Street Excl.    
0.02 
(0.57)   
0.04 
(1.11) 
Growth ×   
Street Excl.    
0.01 
(0.21)   
–0.02 
(–0.33) 
Analysts ×  Street 
Excl.    
0.002 
(0.09)   
–0.02 
(–0.68) 
Loss ×  Street 
Exclusions    
1.23 
(6.16)   
1.36 
(5.03) 
Earn. Volatility ×  
Street Excl.    
–0.07 
(–1.78)   
–0.09 
(–2.76) 
        
Industry Indicators  Not Incl. Not Incl. Included Not Incl. Not Incl. Included 
Mean Qtrly Adj. R2  51.2% 51.5% 55.0% 49.1% 49.3% 53.7% 
Number of Obs.  74,178 74,178 73,320 20,906 20,906 20,438 
        
 
The variables are defined as follows, with all income numbers scaled by assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter:  Street Earnings is the 
I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share.  GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – GAAP earnings.  Future GAAP earnings 
is GAAP earnings per share, as defined above, summed for 4 quarters starting with quarter q+1.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the end of 
quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical tests.  Growth is obtained using common factor analysis on the four variables of Book-to-
MarketAssets, R&D, Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book 
value of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense divided by 
the market value of assets (#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is 
calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value of assets (#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts 
following the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Earnings 
volatility is the standard deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters.  Each of the control variables is decile 
ranked.  Independence Decile is the decile rank of the percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The 
1988–2002 sample extrapolates the earliest year of available board data to all preceding years.  The 1997–2002 sample uses only those years for 
which there is available board data.  Industry Indicators are indicator variables for each of the 48 industries following Fama and French (1997).   
All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 6 – Quarterly Regressions of Future GAAP on Street Exclusions  
for Non-Zero Street Exclusion Firms 
  Dependent Variable:  Future GAAP earnings 
Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) 
Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 1988–2002 1997–2002 
Intercept  0.009 (3.71) 
0.014 
(4.31) 
0.04 
(6.23) 
–0.003 
(–0.85) 
–0.00 
(–0.09) 
0.03 
(3.26) 
Street Earnings (+) 3.06 (43.06) 
3.05 
(43.90) 
3.09 
(39.99) 
3.37 
(23.16) 
3.37 
(23.39) 
3.39 
(27.45) 
Street Exclusions (–) –1.04 (–6.01) 
–1.49  
(–6.21) 
–1.89 
(–4.34) 
–0.85 
(–5.33) 
–1.13 
(–5.82) 
–1.10 
(–1.53) 
Independence Decile   –0.001 (–5.04) 
–0.004 
(–1.97)  
–0.001 
(–1.88) 
–0.001 
(–1.69) 
Street Excl. ×  Indep. 
Decile (+)  
0.10 
(3.85) 
0.08 
(3.08)  
0.07 
(3.76) 
0.06 
(2.22) 
Log of Total Assets    –0.003 (–5.72)   
–0.002 
(–3.48) 
Growth    –0.02 (–3.66)   
–0.002 
(–1.46) 
Analysts    0.001 (2.96)   
0.001 
(1.33) 
Loss 
 
  
–0.001 
(–0.21)   
–0.01 
(–2.88) 
Earnings Volatility 
 
  
–0.001 
(–1.13)   
–0.002 
(–3.63) 
Log of Assets ×  
Street Excl.    
0.02 
(0.90)   
0.04 
(0.82) 
Growth ×   
Street Excl.    
0.01 
(0.20)   
–0.04 
(–0.76) 
Analysts ×  Street 
Excl.    
0.01 
(0.22)   
–0.01 
(–0.21) 
Loss ×  Street 
Exclusions    
1.24 
(5.67)   
1.36 
(3.86) 
Earn. Volatility ×  
Street Excl.    
–0.07 
(–2.06)   
–0.103 
(–3.08) 
        
Industry Indicators  Not Incl. Not Incl. Included Not Incl. Not Incl. Included 
Mean Qtrly Adj. R2  42.0% 42.6% 48.6% 42.0% 42.3% 48.7% 
Number of Obs.  28,567 28,567 27,141 9,702 9,702 9,428 
        
 
The variables are defined as follows, with all income numbers scaled by assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter:  Street Earnings is the I/B/E/S 
reported actual earnings per share.  GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – GAAP earnings.  Future GAAP earnings is GAAP 
earnings per share, as defined above, summed for 4 quarters starting with quarter q+1.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the end of quarter q.  The log 
of this number is used in all statistical tests.  Growth is obtained using common factor analysis on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, 
Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book value of debt plus market 
value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense divided by the market value of assets 
(#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital 
expenditures divided by market value of assets (#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm.  Loss is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of 
return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters.  Each of the control variables is decile ranked.  Independence Decile is the 
decile rank of the percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The 1988–2002 sample extrapolates the 
earliest year of available board data to all preceding years.  The 1997–2002 sample uses only those years for which there is available board data.  
Industry Indicators are indicator variables for each of the 48 industries following Fama and French (1997).  All financial statement variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
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TABLE 7 – Pooled Logistic Regression of Benchmark-Beating on 
Independence Deciles 
 
  Dependent Variable:  Benchmark Beating 
Logit Estimate 
(Pr > 2) 
 Logit Estimate 
(Pr > 2) Independent Variables Predicted Sign 1988–2002  1997–2002 
  All Firms  Non-Zero Exclusions 
 All Firms  Non-Zero Exclusions 
 
Intercept  –4.07 (0.0001)  
–2.30 
(0.0001) 
 
–3.67 
(0.0001)  
–1.94 
(0.0001) 
 
Independence Decile (–) –0.01 (0.076)  
–0.02 
(0.003) 
 –0.01 
(0.271)  
–0.03 
(0.008)  
Log of Total Assets  –0.01 (0.140)  
–0.10 
(0.0001) 
 0.03 
(0.033)  
–0.07 
(0.0001)  
Growth   0.03 (0.004)  
–0.01 
(0.336) 
 
–0.03 
(0.058)  
–0.06 
(0.001)  
Analysts   0.13 (0.0001)  
0.14 
(0.0001) 
 0.141 
(0.0001)  
0.15 
(0.0001)  
Loss  1.66 (0.0001)  
1.10 
(0.0001) 
 1.62 
(0.0001)  
1.10 
(0.0001)  
Earnings Volatility  0.005 (0.539)  
–0.004 
(0.285) 
 0.029 
(0.008)  
–0.01 
(0.655)  
           
Likelihood Ratio  1,909.73 (0.0001)  
1,056.71 
(0.0001) 
 906.02 
(0.0001)  
454.62 
(0.0001)  
Number of Benchmark-
Beating Observations 
 3,366  3,366  1,556  1,556  
Number of Total 
Observations 
 71,090  27,141  20,438  9,428  
 
The variables are defined as follows:  Benchmark Beating is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings 
fall below the I/B/E/S forecast, but Street Earnings meet or exceed the I/B/E/S forecast, where Street Earnings is the 
I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share, GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to 
the I/B/E/S definition) before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#19 or #9) and the I/B/E/S forecast is the 
most recent median forecast preceding the earnings announcement date.  Firms must have non-zero Street Exclusions to be 
included.  Independence decile is the decile rank of the percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal year 
containing quarter q.  The 1988–2002 sample extrapolates the earliest year of available board data to all preceding years.  
The 1997–2002 sample uses only those years for which there is available board data.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the 
end of quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical tests.  Growth is obtained using common factor analysis 
on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-MarketAssets 
is defined as book value of equity divided by the book value of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the quarter 
(#60 / [181+{#61 times #14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense divided by the market value of assets (#46/[181+{#61 
times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as 
capital expenditures divided by market value of assets (#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the number of I/B/E/S 
analysts following the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise.  Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding 
eight quarters.  Each of the control variables is decile ranked.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 8 – Quarterly Regressions of Future Returns on Street Exclusions  
 
  Dependent Variable:  Future Returns 
Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) 
 Mean Quarterly Regression Est. 
(Newey-West t-statistic) 
All Firm-Quarter Observations  Only Non-Zero Exclusions 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
 1988–2002  1997–2002  1988–2002  1997–2002  
Intercept   0.15 (3.18)  
0.15 
(0.96) 
 0.11 
(2.56)  
0.08 
(0.63)  
Street 
Exclusions (–)  
–0.12 
(–3.20)  
–0.16 
(–4.17) 
 
–0.09 
(–2.02)  
–0.15 
(–2.74)  
Independence 
Decile (?)  
–0.002 
(–1.27)  
–0.01 
(–3.60) 
 
–0.001 
(–0.82)  
–0.01 
(–1.90)  
Street Excl. ×  
Indep. Decile  (+)  
0.08 
(2.34)  
0.10 
(2.57) 
 0.05 
(1.07)  
0.10 
(1.78)  
Book to Market 
Ratio (+)  
0.01 
(0.26)  
–0.01 
(–0.10) 
 0.04 
(1.04)  
0.04 
(0.42) 
 
Log of MVE (–)  –0.20 (–4.17)  
–0.05 
(–0.68) 
 
–0.19 
(–3.23)  
–0.05 
(–0.51)  
Firm Beta (βi) (+)  0.11 (1.85)  
0.16 
(1.26) 
 0.10 
(1.46)  
0.15 
(1.03)  
Accruals (–)  –0.09 (–6.00)  
–0.12 
(–5.88) 
 
–0.08 
(–3.99)  
–0.10 
(–3.50)  
Momentum (+)  0.05 (1.40)  
–0.04 
(–0.46) 
 0.08 
(1.78)  
–0.01 
(–0.05)  
           
Mean Quarterly 
Adjusted R2 
 
 6.5%  9.3%  8.1%  10.9%  
Number of 
Observations 
  52,619  14,465  19,600  6,495  
 
The variables are defined as follows, with all earnings numbers scaled by total assets per share at the end of the 
fiscal quarter:  Future Returns is the one year ahead abnormal compound buy-and-hold returns inclusive of all 
dividends and other distributions beginning two days after the earnings announcement and continuing for one year.  
In the event of delisting, CRSP’s delisting return is first used, adjusting for the delisting bias documented in 
Shumway (1997), followed by the return on the market-value-weighted index.  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – 
GAAP earnings, where Street Earnings is the I/B/E/S reported actual earnings per share and GAAP earnings is the 
applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Independence Decile is the decile rank of the percent of board members that 
are independent in the fiscal year containing quarter t.  The 1988–2002 sample extrapolates the earliest year of 
available board data to all preceding years.  The 1997–2002 sample uses only those years for which there is 
available board data.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  The Book-to- 
Market Ratio is constructed as the book value of equity (#60) divided by the market value of equity at the end of 
quarter t (#61 times #14).  Beta is estimated using weekly returns over the two years prior to the initial fiscal quarter.  
MVE is the natural log of the size of the firm and is measured by the market value of equity at the end of quarter t.  
Accruals = GAAP earnings per share (#19) – cash from operations (#108).  Sales Growth is the change in sales from 
quarter t–4 to t (#2). Variables are ranked monthly and assigned to deciles. The continuous value of the variables is 
replaced by decile-rank in the regressions.  Regressions are estimated quarterly and mean coefficients are presented.  
Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West correction (see footnote 20 for 
details), are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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TABLE 9 – Quarterly Regressions of Future GAAP earnings on Street Exclusions and Insider Trading 
 
  Dependent Variable:  Future GAAP earnings 
Mean Quarterly Regression Estimate 
(Newey-West t-statistic) 
All Firm-Quarter Observations  Only Non-Zero Street Exclusions Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
1988–1999  1997–1999  1988–1999  1997–1999 
             
Intercept  0.004 (2.94) 
0.009 
(6.22)  
–0.007 
(–7.53) 
–0.003 
(–2.38)  
0.006 
(3.16) 
0.012 
(5.96)  
–0.010 
(–4.81) 
–0.002 
(–0.67) 
Street Earnings (+) 3.34 (56.80) 
3.32 
(56.33)  
3.63 
(28.92) 
3.62 
(29.03)  
3.03 
(43.48) 
3.01 
(44.16)  
3.37 
(21.65) 
3.38 
(21.97) 
Street Exclusions (–) –1.10 (–4.83) 
–1.06 
(–4.77)  
–0.72 
(–3.72) 
–0.72 
(–3.86)  
–1.04 
(–5.02) 
–1.01 
(–4.97)  
–0.73 
(–3.83) 
–0.75 
(–3.95) 
Insider Trading Decile  0.001 (6.34) 
0.003 
(6.47)  
0.002 
(5.56) 
0.002 
(5.87)  
0.002 
(5.31) 
0.001 
(5.29)  
0.002 
(6.11) 
0.002 
(6.30) 
Street Exclusions ×  
Abs (Insider Trading) Decile (–) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
–0.09 
(–2.42)  
0.01 
(–0.47) 
–0.05 
(–1.85)  
0.01 
(0.53) 
–0.09 
(–2.35)  
0.02 
(0.78) 
–0.03 
(–1.29) 
Independence Decile   –0.001 (–11.26)   
–0.001 
(–5.20)   
–0.001 
(–8.91)   
–0.001 
(–1.89) 
Street Exclusions ×  
Abs (Insider Trading) Decile 
×  Independence Decile 
(+)  0.02 (3.11) 
 
  
0.01 
(3.66)   
0.02 
(3.32)   
0.01 
(4.43) 
             
Mean Quarterly Adjusted R2  53.0% 53.3%  50.2% 50.4%  43.7% 44.3%  43.6% 43.8% 
             
Number of Observations  63,355 63,355  11,994 11,994  23,442 23,442  5,479 5,479 
             
 
The variables are defined as follows, with all income numbers scaled by assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter:  Street Earnings is the I/B/E/S reported 
actual earnings per share.  GAAP earnings is the applicable basic or diluted income per share (matched to the I/B/E/S definition) before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (#19 or #9).  Street Exclusions = Street Earnings – GAAP earnings.  Future GAAP earnings is GAAP earnings per share, as defined 
above, summed for 4 quarters starting with quarter q+1.  Abs (Insider Trading) Decile is the decile rank of the absolute value of managerial insider net sales from 
the day following the earnings announcement through the end of the quarter, calculated as [ 
==
HI
hi
,
1,1
(SSih / SHih) – 
==
HI
hi
,
1,1
(SPih / SHih)] where SSih, SPih, 
SHih are shares sold in the open market, purchased in the open market, and held by officer i for each post-announcement trade h for the given firm in the given 
quarter.  This data is only available through the first quarter of 2000. Independence Decile is the decile rank of the percent of board members that are independent 
in the fiscal year containing quarter q.  The 1988–2002 sample extrapolates the earliest year of available board data to all preceding years.  The 1997–2002 
sample uses only those years for which there is available board data.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 10 – Quarterly Regressions of Inclusions on Board Independence 
 
  Dependent Variable:  First Call Inclusions 
Quarterly Regression Estimate 
(Ordinary Least Squares t-statistic) 
All Firm-Quarter Observations  Only Non-Zero Street Exclusions Independent Variables 
Pred. 
Sign 
1988–1999  1997–1999  1988–1999  1997–1999 
             
Intercept  0.036 (13.13) 
0.035 
(2.07)  
0.033 
(10.48) 
0.039 
(2.26)  
0.037 
(13.08) 
0.037 
(2.06)  
0.035 
(10.75) 
0.043 
(2.37) 
Independence Decile (–) –0.002 (–4.07) 
–0.001 
(–1.84)  
–0.002 
(–3.40) 
–0.001 
(–1.96)  
–0.002 
(–4.33) 
–0.001 
(–2.21)  
–0.003 
(–4.04) 
–0.002 
(–2.46) 
Log of Total Assets   –0.005 (–6.02)   
–0.003 
(–2.95)   
–0.004 
(–5.46)   
–0.003 
(–2.82) 
Growth    –0.001 (–1.29)   
–0.001 
(–1.38)   
–0.001 
(–1.50)   
–0.001 
(–1.44) 
Analysts  
 
 
0.001 
(0.81)   
–0.000 
(–0.41)   
0.0001 
(0.17)   
–0.001 
(–0.69) 
Loss    0.024 (6.42)   
0.017 
(3.91)   
0.022 
(5.63)   
0.014 
(3.27) 
Earnings Volatility   –0.0003 (–0.44) 
 
  
–0.0004 
(–0.54)   
0.0001 
(0.14)   
–0.0002 
(–0.21) 
             
Industry Indicators  Not Incl. Included  Not Incl. Included  Not Incl. Included  Not Incl. Included 
             
Mean Quarterly Adjusted R2  0.19% 2.08%  0.23% 1.87%  0.23% 2.19%  0.36% 2.21% 
             
Number of Observations  8,306 8,074  4,621 4,518  7,764 7,544  4,247 4,151 
             
 
The variables are defined as follows, with all income numbers scaled by assets per share at the end of the fiscal quarter:  Inclusions are those exclusions made by 
managers that First Call included in actual earnings.  Independence Decile is the decile rank of the percent of board members that are independent in the fiscal 
year containing quarter q.  The 1988–2002 sample extrapolates the earliest year of available board data to all preceding years.  The 1997–2002 sample uses only 
those years for which there is available board data.  Total Assets (#44) is measured at the end of quarter q.  The log of this number is used in all statistical tests.  
Growth is obtained using common factor analysis on the four variables of Book-to-MarketAssets, R&D, Sales Growth, and Investment Expenditures. Book-to-
MarketAssets is defined as book value of equity divided by the book value of debt plus market value of equity at the end of the quarter (#60 / [181+{#61 times 
#14}]). R&D is calculated as R&D expense divided by the market value of assets (#46/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Sales Growth is the change in sales from quarter 
q–4 to q (#2). Investment Expenditures is calculated as capital expenditures divided by market value of assets (#30/[181+{#61 times #14}]). Analysts is the 
number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm.  Loss is an indicator variable that is equal to one if GAAP earnings (#25) is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  
Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of return on assets (#25 divided by #44) over the preceding eight quarters.  Each of the control variables is decile 
ranked.  Industry Indicators are indicator variables for each of the 48 industries following Fama and French (1997).   Coefficients are multiplied by 100, as 
Inclusions are small.  All financial statement variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
